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Introduction: The Japanese Dialogue with a German
Martin Heidegger’s apparent fascination and affinity with Japanese 
Buddhist thought is demonstrated in several ways. For example, he is 
said to have remarked upon reading D. T. Suzuki’s modern exposition 
of Zen, “If I understand this man correctly, this is what I have been try­
ing to say in all my writings.”1 Heidegger also is reported to have 
responded when shown the Ten Oxherding Pictures by Tsujimura 
Koichi by pointing out the correspondence between the Zen saying in 
picture nine, “The flowers blossom just as they blossom,” and the 
mystical poem of Angelius Silesius he discussed extensively in Der Satz 
vom Grund, “The rose is without why/it blossoms/because it 
blossoms.”2 As Ueda Shizuteru comments, Heidegger’s concern, like 
that of Zen, is to express reality from a contemplative standpoint as a 
“simple, pure emergence out of itself” or an “infinite openness of 
nothingness.” Reality is thereby directly experienced as it is “without 
why” in a way prior to the abstraction, speculation, and rationaliza­
1 Reported by William Barrett in “Zen for the West,” an Introduction to Zen Bud­
dhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, ed. William Barrett (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956): xi.
* Noted by Ueda Shizuteru, “The Zen Buddhist Experience of the Truly Beautiful,” 
The Eastern Buddhist, xxii/1: 4. As Ueda points out, Heidegger reads “because” 
(weii) as “while.” Also, as indicated in the conclusions below, Ueda argues that from 




tion of conceptual thinking so that “(t)here is nothing between reality 
and the words.”3
’ Ibid: 12-15.
4 In particular Watsuji is known for his critique of what he considers Heidegger's 
overemphasis on temporality while overlooking the function of spatiality including 
geography and climate, in FudO ningengakuteki kOsatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. 
1939).
5 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971): 3. In another context Heidegger uses the term “danger” in a 
different sense to refer to the deficiencies of the technological era of “enframing” 
(Geste/l).
In the 1920*s Heidegger had close contact with and exerted a tremen­
dous philosophical influence on a number of intellectuals who went on 
to become the leading thinkers of twentieth-century Japan. Several 
figures associated with the Kyoto-school, including Watsuji TetsurO, 
Tanabe Hajime, Nishitani Keiji, and Kuki Shflzd, studied with Heideg­
ger in Germany and later acknowledged their indebtedness to him even 
as they criticized his method of hermeneutic phenomenology.4 Yet, 
despite his personal familiarity with Japanese thinkers and ideas, 
Heidegger was very cautious and reluctant about overstating the con­
nections between Eastern and Western thought. Rather, in “A 
Dialogue on Language, between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” he 
stresses to the Japanese participant the “danger” inherent in East- 
West dialogue which is based on limitations in language itself. That is, 
fundamental structural differences in language, though at times in­
conspicuous, create an insurmountable impasse to any attempt at ge­
nuine encounter between two modes of human existence. Heidegger 
has referred to language as the “house of Being” and notes regretfully, 
“we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than 
Eastasian man. .. . And so, a dialogue from house to house remains 
nearly impossible.”5 On the one hand, Heidegger’s reluctance is due to 
his commitment to overcoming Western onto-theological thinking on 
its own terms without resorting to answers superficially gleaned from 
another tradition. At the same time, he is mindful of the tendency, to 
which Japanese themselves fall prey, to corrupt Eastasian thought by 
reducing it to seemingly handy Western metaphysical categories.
Thus Heidegger’s attitude is a mixture of approach and avoidance. 
What is the attraction of Eastasian thought for Heidegger, and what 
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are the factors underlying the danger he considers implicit in dialogue? 
Does this danger outweigh any benefit of philosophical exchange, or 
can it be overcome? Aside from a few references to the Chinese notion 
of Tao, Heidegger’s only sustained discussion concerning the East re­
mains “A Dialogue on Language,” based on a 1953/54 conversation 
he held with Tezuka Tornio, noted translator of German literature in­
cluding Holderlin and Rilke as well as some of Heidegger’s works.6 
Heidegger met with Tezuka to commemorate the death of Kuki Shuzo 
(1888-1941), best known for his monograph *Iki' no kOzO (The Struc­
ture of Tki’), a modern hermeneutic presentation of the Tokugawa era 
literary ideal of generally translated as “chic” or “style,” as the 
key to understanding the true nature of Japanese aesthetics and 
culture.7 Kuki was one of the Japanese scholars with whom Heidegger 
had the most intimate personal association, and he was also a teacher 
of Tezuka.8 It seems that Kuki’s focus on aesthetics may have been a 
factor helping inspire Heidegger’s famous “turn” (Kehre) from his ex­
istentialist concerns in Being and Time to the interpretations in his later 
writings of poetry and art as conducive to a naturalist disclosure of Be­
ing.
6 A list of Tezuka’s works appears in Tezuka Tornio zensho (Tokyo: Iwanami 
shoten, 1981), volume 7: 435-57. Tezuka discusses his conversation with Heidegger in 
“Haideggaa tono ichijikan” as part of his translation of the dialogue, Kotoba ni tsuite 
no taiwa (Tokyo: RisOsha, 1968): 159-66.
’ Kuki’s monograph appears as the first work in volume I of Kuki ShOzb zensho 
(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1981): 7-85.
8 For a detailed discussion of Kuki's travels and studies in Europe in the 1920’s in­
cluding his meetings with Heidegger, Sartre, and others, see Stephen Light, Shazo 
Kuki and Jean-Pau! Sartre: Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Ex­
istential Phenomenology (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987). Light 
examines the “legend” that it was Kuki who first introduced Sartre to Heidegger.
’ Heidegger: 2.
The discussion between Heidegger and Tezuka begins with an at­
tempt to uncover the meaning of iki, about which Heidegger confesses 
he “never had more than a distant inkling”9 from Kuki’s own explana­
tions. From this starting point the goal of the dialogue is ultimately 
directed toward discerning the point of convergence between the non- 
metaphysical tradition of Japanese thought, which Heidegger assumes 
was never plagued by the presuppositions of Western substantive on­
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tology, and modem post-metaphysical philosophy, still struggling to 
overcome the legacy of the Platonic-Christian onto-theological tradi­
tion. But the participants are the first to admit that the dialogue seems 
to fail in reaching its aims. The Japanese’s description of iki as the 
“sensuous radiance through whose lively delight there breaks the ra­
diance of something suprasensuous”10 remains unsatisfying to the In­
quirer. Heidegger suspects that Kuki and Tezuka have succumbed to 
the danger by allowing Western metaphysical bifurcations of sensuous 
(aisthetori) and nonsensuous (noeton), real and ideal, material and 
spiritual reflecting “the complete Europeanization of the earth and of 
man” to distort the presentation of Eastasian art so that it “is ob­
scured and shunted into a realm that is inappropriate to it.”11 Tezuka 
attempts to introduce Heidegger to Noh drama, with which the Inquir­
er is unfamiliar, and Heidegger presses Tezuka to step outside the con­
text of iki and explore the implications of the Japanese understanding 
of language (kotoba) in philosophy and aesthetics, but this also ends 
on a tentative and inconclusive note. In this case Heidegger, despite 
his sensitivity to the problem of violating Eastern thought, may distort 
the genuine Japanese view when he uses some of his trademark ter­
minology to define koto (words) as “the appropriating occurrence of 





For Heidegger, the dialogue must fail because it is undermined at its 
root by the danger, so that in stepping out of one’s own house of being 
to reach an empathetic appreciation of the other’s house, the original 
viewpoint is lost and yet the new one is not satisfactorily gained. That 
is, “The language of the dialogue constantly destroy[s] the possibility 
of saying what the dialogue [is] about.”13 However, Heidegger’s con­
clusion may be somewhat too drastic and misleading because it is based 
largely on his inability to fathom the meaning of iki, and this in turn is 
due not so much to inherent limitations or discrepancies in language as 
the inappropriate representation and use of iki in the dialogue. Kuki 
argues that iki cannot be translated by a single word into any European 
language. “Therefore, it is justifiable,” he writes, “to consider 'iki' a 
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remarkable self-expression of Eastern culture, indeed, of the distinc­
tive experience of the Japanese people (yamato minzoku).™ Kuki’s 
analysis is no doubt perceptive, but it is also the case that iki is very 
much rooted in a particular social-historical context, that is, the 
Tokugawa “floating world” (ukiyo) which determined literary and ar­
tistic values. The ideal of iki is an artistic sensibility with some spiritual 
overtones incorporated from Buddhism and bushidO. But it is based on 
the duality or polarity of intersexual relations in a way closely resembl­
ing French dandyism, and is derived from the desire to find fulfillment 
in the demi-monde on the part of rising merchants and fallen samurai 
in class-conscious Edo society.
Thus Heidegger, though not fully aware of the reasons, is on target 
in his misgivings concerning the appropriateness of i’W and his interest 
in stressing poetic language as a basis for dialogue. Heidegger feels that 
kotoba “is a wondrous word, and therefore inexhaustible to our think­
ing,”* 15 because it seems to approximate his view of primordial Saying 
as the essential nature of contemplative language attuned to the rela­
tion of Being and beings without why. But the key point that does not 
emerge in the dialogue is that in Japanese contemplative aesthetics— 
that is, literature and literary criticism based on some form of Buddhist 
meditation, including shikan, zazen and nembutsit in Shunzei, Teika, 
Ddgen, Chdmei, KenkG, Zeami and others—the role of kotoba as 
creative expression is invariably intimately connected to kokoro (mind 
or heart/mind) as authenticated spiritual intentionality. The 
inseparability of kotoba and kokoro is particularly stressed in the 
yttgen style of waka poetry and Noh theater (despite important 
differences in the literary forms). For example, Teika writes of the 
yQgen style of poetry that “kokoro and kotoba [function] like the two 
wings of a bird.”16
'• Kuki: 12. Peter N. Dale argues that Kuki’s philosophy reflecting nihonjinron 
(“Japanese-ism”) theory betrays a nationalistic tendency parallel to and influenced by 
Heidegger’s nationalist mysticism, in The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1986): 70-73.
15 Heidegger: 47.
16 Fujiwara Teika. “MaigetsushO.” in Nihon kagaku laikei, ed. N. Sasaki (Tokyo: 
1935 and reprinted), volume III: 349.
Therefore, Buddhist-influenced yilgen poetics may be a more ap­
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propriate starting point for the dialogue with Heidegger than “floating 
world” stylishness. In that case, the problematics of dialogue arc at 
once less dire and more serious than Heidegger assumes. The obstacle 
is less severe because once the misunderstandings about iki are sorted 
out and deconstructed the possibility of communication between 
languages is opened up. But the dialogue is more demanding because 
for Heidegger an appreciation of kotoba to express “the flower 
blossoms because it blossoms’* must involve coming to terms with its 
inseparability with kokoro, and the need from the Japanese standpoint 
for spiritual realization through contemplative discipline as the basis 
for poetic discourse. I will argue that it is this requirement of spiritual 
training and attainment implicit in Japanese aesthetics that generates 
the obstacle and danger for Heidegger and not the supposed separation 
of houses of being. To demonstrate this contention, I will examine the 
reasons for Heidegger’s fascination with Eastasia and the drawbacks in 
Kuki’s study of iki as a starting point for dialogue. Then, I will explain 
the merits of the contemplative yQgen ideal as a substitute basis for ge­
nuine philosophical encounter by discussing the relation between 
word, thing, and mind in Buddhist-oriented aesthetics and Heidegger’s 
thought.
Heidegger Turning East
Heidegger’s interest in Japanese Zen and poetry seems connected to 
the double meaning of English term “turn” in Heidegger’s thought. 
First, Heidegger’s own turn (Kehre) from his early existential to later 
naturalist approach to Being heightens his affinity with the holistic 
view of the unity of humans and nature prior to the subject-object 
dichotomy reflected in much of Japanese thought and literature. In this 
sense Heidegger’s concern with Eastasia is an extension of his preoc­
cupation with the pre-Socratics as well as art, poetry, mysticism 
and Nietzschean philosophy as Western alternatives to the onto-the- 
ological mainstream. Heidegger particularly appreciates aesthetics 
because he views the poet and thinker as “neighbors” who occupy 
parallel though independent summits in the pursuit of Being by sharing 
meditative thinking or releasement which is receptive of the disclosure 
of Being. “Poetry that thinks,” he writes, “is in truth the topology 
of Being” in disclosing the “whereabouts of its actual presence” or 
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the “splendor of the simple.”17 Second, Heidegger values Eastasian 
thought because the modern turn (Wendung) in the history of Western 
metaphysics has led to planetary Europeanization and the hegemony of 
the calculative or representational thinking of technology. Traditional 
Japanese thinking cannot escape being threatened with extinction, but 
this grave challenge and danger may also awaken the East to the need 
to reevaluate its role as a vital source for overcoming the very forces 
that are corrupting it.
17 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971): 7-12.
18 See Ronald Bruzina, “Heidegger on the Metaphor and Philosophy,” in Heideg­
ger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1978): 198.
” Heidegger, On the Way to Language: 67.
20 Ibid: 51 and 85.
What specifically does Heidegger hope to find in the Eastasian house 
of Being that will guide him on his woodpath (Holzwege) into explor­
ing and “cutting furrows into the soil of Being”? Heidegger seems to 
feel that Japanese language and thought, untainted by the history of 
metaphysical categorization, may provide a more direct and immediate 
example of primordial Saying than is available in the errancy of the 
oblivion of Being that characterizes Western thought. True language as 
“Saying” (die Sage, Sagen) is not a matter of exposition, critique, 
definition, or explanation but of disclosing the “nearness” (Nahheit) 
and “stillness” that constitute the “relation of all relations” or the ap­
propriating event of the belonging-together of Being and humans.18 
Thus genuine thinking is intimately connected to poetry because 
neither endeavor is concerned merely with gaining knowledge or ex­
changing information. Indeed, poetry may have priority since it cap­
tures with unclouded confidence the “wellspring of language” and oc­
cupies the “mysterious landscape [which] borders on the fateful source 
of speech.”19 Furthermore, the subtle and suggestive expressions of 
poetry seem to come closer than thinking, which may lapse into meta­
physical conceptualization or suprasensuous abstraction, to reaching 
Heidegger’s avowed aim of speaking not “about” but “from out of 
[or within] the nature of language.”20
The key to authentic Saying is a language of beckoning hints and ver­
bal gestures which convey the stillness of silence and attentive listening.
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True language as a product of meditative thinking allows beings to 
come into their unconcealedness or openness while preserving the ten­
dency of Being itself to remain hidden or concealed as the disclosure 
takes place. It avoids the onto-theological pit falls of perceiving beings 
alone clearly while overlooking the withdrawnness of Being as the veil­
ed source of their coming to presence (realism), or of bypassing beings 
to gaze upon the speculated realm of the suprasensuous (idealism). 
Thus, genuine Saying consists of understated words that trail off in an 
explanation or description [as in George’s poem, “Where word breaks 
off.. .”]21 because they are unable to adequately express the depths of 
experience, and yet they evoke and capture the experience all the more 
fully since in acknowledging their shortcoming they suggest a hidden 
dimension beyond the overt and concrete. Saying depicts the splendor 
of the simple without why. This view of language seems to approach 
closely the ideal of yOgen which reflects an overabundance or plenitude 
of meaning (yo/d) contained in sparse, suggestive words (kotoba 
tarazu) conveying a mysterious depth expressed in and through yet 
hovering over and above the actual diction. YQgen often offers a sim­
ple, seemingly realistic depiction of a veiled, shadowy scene (for exam­
ple, “autumn dusk descends,” aki noyOgure) whose mystery and beau­
ty is preferable to dazzling clarity. Heidegger writes that poetry “sings 
of the mysterious nearness of the far-tarrying power of the word,” and 
that “Saying is the gathering that joins all appearance of the in itself 
manifold showing which everywhere lets all that is shown abide within 
itself.”22 234In what appears to be a parallel vein, Shunzei asserts that in a 
poem of “mystery and depth” (yfigen), “The atmosphere hovers over 
the poem, as it were, like the haze that trails over the cherry blossoms 
in spring . . .*,2J And ChOmei argues that the “superiority . .. such 
poems have over mere ordinary prose ... is only when many meanings 
are compressed into a single word, when the depths of feeling are 
exhausted yet not expressed, when an unseen world hovers in the 
atmosphere of the poem .. .’,24
21 Ibid: 57-108 (“The Nature of Language”).
22 Ibid: 87 and 126.
23 Robert H. Brower and Earl Miner, Japanese Court Poetry (Stanford: Stanford 




One way of understanding Heidegger’s view that Saying at once 
allows for openness and preserves hiddenness is to consider the im­
agery of “gift” (die Schenk) and “giving” (es gibt) he frequently uses 
in reference to the relation between Being and Humans. For example, 
his notion of thinking as the gift of Being suggests that the bestowal 
that has been granted by Being must be received by thinkers and poets 
with a sense of gratitude and thanksgiving. How do they show their ap­
preciation? The difficulty in creating an appropriate response is based 
on the structure of gift which invariably arrives wrapped in a package. 
That is, the item that represents the gift per se is contained in wrapping 
so as to be concealed in order to heighten the curiosity, excitement and 
mystery surrounding the gift-giving. If beings are portrayed in the 
analogy as the gift, Being is not symbolized merely by the ornamenta­
tion of the packaging. Rather Being signifies the entire process or 
belonging-together of decorating, sending, opening and responding to 
the present. Being is hidden in that it is not to be identified with any par­
ticular aspect of the event or confused with the way beings are wrapped 
up—such a view is the errancy into which the metaphysical tradition 
has consistently fallen—but encompasses the unity of modalities. For 
genuine Saying to be liberated from onto-theological fixations, it must 
develop alternative forms of expression that highlight the whole proc­
ess without reducing Being to any one aspect. That is, Saying unravels 
the wrapping of the gift while preserving the decoration which at once 
reveals and conceals its source; or, it allows seeing things not only as 
they are but, as in the Buddhist notion of the “finger pointing to the 
moon,” as more than that because they bring into view presencing or 
gift-giving/receiving itself.
How successful is Heidegger himself in accomplishing this? Heideg­
ger’s efforts in language are largely directed toward formulating 
neologisms, tautologies, figura etymologica, and creative (mistransla­
tions that are flexible, openended, and multidimensional sayings essen­
tially creative in a way prior to the onto-theological distinctions be­
tween abstract and concrete, literal and metaphorical, logical and 
mythical.25 Heidegger’s novel expressions including “temporality tem- 
25 Erasmus Schofer, “Heidegger’s Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and 
Grammatical Specialities,” in On Heidegger and Language, ed. and tr. Joseph J. 
Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1972). 281-301.
68
THE FLOWER BLOSSOMS
poralizes," “nothingness nihilates," and “language of being: being 
of language*' seem parallel to Suzuki's comment on Mahayana Bud­
dhist writings on enlightenment: “. .. when language is forced to be 
used for things of this [transcendental] world, lokottara, it becomes 
warped and assumes all kinds of crookedness: oxymora, paradoxes, 
contradictions, contortions, absurdities, oddities, ambiguities, and ir­
rationalities."26 Heidegger’s primordial Saying and Zen “language of 
samadhi"27 both seem odd and distorted from the standpoint of con­
ventional syntax because they consist of a polysemy playfully exercis­
ing a transcendental experience without why. Yet Ronald Bruzina 
argues—and Heidegger, who often admitted the circularity and in­
completeness of his thought might agree—that the German philoso­
pher remains trapped between two worldviews, one the burden carried 
from the past of metaphysical disdain for metaphor and myth and the 
other a goal of post-metaphysical poetic/mystical Saying glimpsed but 
never realized:
26 D. T. Suzuki, On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, ed. Edward Conze (New York: 
Harper, 1968): 243.
27 Sekida Katsuki, Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy (New York and Tokyo: 
Weatherhill, 1975): 99.
28 Bruzina: 199.
Heidegger’s thinking, in its attempt to proceed otherwise, 
nonetheless always begins from within Western rationality, 
from within the distinction and performances he wishes to 
negate. Thus it is that Heidegger’s writing is thinking and not 
poetry, while aiming to be simply ‘Saying.’ Thus it is that his 
words are to be taken literally in his rejections of the meta­
physical schema he literally affirms as dominating Western 
mind, while those words work toward a worded thinking 
that offers nothing of literal explication."28
It is the attempt to build a pathway bridging this gap or to find access 
to discourse on reality without why that compels Heidegger to turn 
East. But what is the point of departure of genuine dialogue?
Iki an Inappropriate Starting Point
The monograph ‘ZW* no kOzO was Kuki’s first major work and is still 
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regarded as his classic. Begun in 1926 while he was studying in Paris, it 
was published in 1930 first in the journal ShisO and later that year in 
book form. It appears as the introductory piece in the first volume of 
his collected works, accompanied by an earlier draft, ‘ZArf’ no Honshit- 
su (The Essence of ‘Iki*), and the notes used in preparation of these 
manuscripts are included in a supplementary volume. ‘/Ari’ no kbzO 
clearly shows Kuki’s strong reaction to his studies in France and Ger­
many during the 1920’s in two ways: it reflects the influences he absorbs 
from European philosophers, including Bergson, Sartre, Husserl, and 
Heidegger, and it fulfills his desire to identify and explicate the essence 
of Japanese culture and thought to the West. Kuki maintains that each 
culture and language has its unique features and words so organically 
interconnected they cannot be transported or translated into any other 
one. “Therefore,” he writes, “the concrete meanings of the language 
of a nation express national existence and reflect the distinctive at­
mosphere of national experience.”29 For example, the English words 
“spirit,” “intelligence,” and “wit” approach but do not fully capture 
the French “esprit.” Similarly, though lAri is the Japanese translation 
of “chic,” its complete meaning is beyond that of related words such 
as raffing or the English elegant and coquettish based on French terms. 
Distinctive national expressions such as iki are not abstract concepts 
but phenomena of consciousness (Husserl’s influence) which require ex­
plication through hermeneutics rather than formalism (Heidegger) to 
disclose the priority of existence over essence (Sartre).
29 Kuki: 8.
30 Hisamatsu Sen’ichi, The Vocabulary of Japanese Literary Aesthetics (Tokyo: 
Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1964): 104. See also Donald Keene, World 
Within Walls: Japanese Literature of the Pre-Modem Era, 1600-1867 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1976): 398-437.
To understand Kuki’s interpretation of ikit it is necessary to situate 
the term in its original cultural and literary context. Iki was a leading 
aesthetic ideal associated with the writings of ninjbbon (romances) and 
sharebon (realistic stories) of the gesaku (culture of play) literature of 
the late Edo floating world. It implies a “discreet elegance, combined 
with an urban polish in which coquetry is the dominant tone.”30 Iki is 
related to the ideal behavior of the suijin (man of taste or jwi, another 
pronunciation of iki) or tsUjin (man of polish or tsQ) who demon­
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strates the “nonchalant, urban sophistication of one completely at 
home in the demi-monde,’*31 or an ability to comport oneself proper­
ly in the geisha quarters by dealing objectively with human emotions. 
The background to the development of iki was the frequency in 
dramatic literature, particularly Chikamatsu’s works, as well as in 
Tokugawa society of the double-suicide (shinjU) resulting from the con­
flict between giri (social obligations) and ninjb (human passions). The 
typical pattern involved an aspiring townsman (chOnin) or unmoneyed 
samurai (rOnin) who fell in love with a geisha and had no way of recon­
ciling his illicit emotion with his social duty; both parties were doomed 
and chose a redemptive voluntary death rather than suffer ostracism 
and other forms of social punishment.32 Iki to a large extent re­
presented a middle path out of this conflict by allowing the male party 
in the relationship to remain detached from instead of overwhelmed 
by his feelings, content with an aloof flirtation and seductiveness not 
consummated and therefore not subject to scrutiny.33
” Ibid: 109.
K The redemptive dimension of shinjQ is a combination of nembutsu Am id ism and 
bushido ethics. On the one hand, the lovers represent a protest and counterpoint to the 
oppressive dominance of the shogunate and samurai class (constituting giri). But their 
willingness to die for the sake of personal feelings (ninjb) displays an implicit accep­
tance of the bushidd's self-sacrificing embracing of death (as in works like Hagakure) 
that is also based on the millenarian hope for a perfect, eternal union attained through 
rebirth in the Pure Land. See Minamoto Ryden, Giri to ninjo (Tokyo: Chao Kdron - 
sha, 1969): 98-153.
” On the social-historical implications of iki in the context of individual freedom 
and democratic pursuit sec Kawahara Hiroshi, Tenkanki no shisO: Nihon kindaika wo 
megutte (Tokyo: Waseda daigaku shuppansha, 1963): 203-38.
Kuki elaborates on this historical phenomenon by centering iki in a 
constellation of terms dealing with Japanese aesthetics and forms of 
behavior. His work consists of four parts: the first two lay the founda­
tion by examining the intensive or connotative (naihOteki) and exten­
sive or denotative (gaienteki) structure of /£/, and the final sections 
discuss examples of physical and artistic expressions. The intensive 
structure consists of three aspects. The spiritual qualities of Buddhist 
resignation (akirame) or detachment from the world of evanescence 
and of noble spirit (ikuji) derived from bushido loyalty and pluck 
reflect the two main influences on Japanese civilization and give /Ari a 
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lofty idealism transcending the mundane world. These factors in turn 
are based on the fundamental duality that characterizes coquetry 
(bitai): “[If] is a dualistic situation which forms the possibility of rela­
tion between oneself and the opposite sex whereby they mutually ex­
perience a sense of contrast with the other.”34 The duality of coquetry 
necessarily involves a constant tension as it seeks to consummate 
union. “Coquetry has as its fate the fulfillment as well as the termina­
tion of the desired aim of conquest of the opposite sex.”35 *This para­
digm of duality is also the key to the extensive structure of iki, which 
involves antimonies between the valued and unvalued, and positive 
and negative factors of general human nature and intersexual partic­
ularity. In a tightly argued discussion illustrated by the geometrical 
metaphor of a cube subdivided into numerous triangles and rectangles, 
Kuki offsets four oppositions: refinement (johiri) and baseness (gehiri), 
dapperness (hade) and subdued taste (Jimi), stylishness (iki) and raffish­
ness (yabo), and restraint (shibumi) and sentimentality (amami)* Iki 
in a narrow sense is one of the eight terms [used in this context in 
the sense of noble spirit] but its deeper and broader meaning is the 
self-regulating principle which keeps each aspect of the polarities from 
tending to the extreme. It seeks the middle ground between apathy and 
flamboyance, severity and vulgarity, and is thus related to medieval 
aesthetic ideals, especially gracefulness (miyabi) and purifying solitude 
and patina (sabi). One of the main artistic manifestations of iki is 
the architecture of the traditional teahouse (chaya) with its contrast be­
tween an exterior wood design and asymmetrical interior in addition to 
its festive atmosphere and somber, indirect lighting. Another example 




37 For example, Kuki is an important influence on Doi Takeo’s psychological ac­
count of amae (dependence) as the basis of Japanese society, in 'Amae' no kOzO 
(Tokyo: KObundO, 1971).
The aim of this paper is not to evaluate the significance of Kuki’s 
work as an explanation of the uniqueness of Japanese culture37 but to 
consider its relevance for philosophical dialogue with Heidegger, who 
suspects shortcomings. In that light, there seem to be two main reasons 
why iki is an inappropriate starting point for such an East-West ex­
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change. The first factor involves the historical background of the 
development of r’Atf, which was originally intrinsically connected to 
Tokugawa society as a way of circumventing the shogunate’s sump­
tuary laws aimed at restricting the fleeting pleasures of the floating 
world. In its broader sense, the kind of tastefulness iki represents helps 
explain the aesthetic of classical and medieval Japanese poetry and 
theater as well.38 Still, its basic ambience is a far cry from Heidegger 
the Schwarzwalder whose later writings increasingly reflect a fascina­
tion with naturalism and a disinterest in human relations as an access 
to truth. Whereas Heidegger is preoccupied with the Greek impact on 
German thought and language, Kuki’s influences are the urbanitas of 
Rome and especially the dandyism of early nineteenth century French 
writers Barbey and Baudelaire who sought through rebellious in­
dividuality, sexual ambiguity, and literary flair to escape le spleen of 
boredom and dejection.39 A far closer parallel to Heidegger’s approach 
in Japanese aesthetics is the medieval hermitage tradition of poets and 
monks who attained a contemplative awareness of nature frequently ex­
pressed in yQgen.
“ Set Takie Sugiyama Lebra, Japanese Patterns of Behavior (Honolulu: University 
of Hawaii Press, 1976): 19-21; and Kawakita Michiaki, “The World of Shibui," 
Japan Quarterly, 8: 33-42.
w Kuki acknowledges his indebtedness to the writings of Barbey d’Aurevilly who fre­
quently commented on Baudelaire. For an account of the nineteenth-century literary/ 
aesthetic phenomenon of dandyism beginning in England and migrating to France, see 
Ellen Moers, The Dandy: Brummell to Beerbohm (New York: The Viking Press, 1960). 
In his study of ukiyo literature, Howard Hibbett describes the tsQjin: “On a spring 
afternoon in Kyoto a dandy strolls along the river... his parasol tilted exquisitely; 
another at a Gion tea-house, lies propped on one elbow near a tobacco tray and a small 
lacquer table, in a cluster of attentive courtesans, and listens indifferently as one of 
them sings to the accompaniment of her samisen...” In The Floating World in 
Japanese Fiction (Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Tuttle, 1975): 32.
The second and more important limitation of iki is metaphysical. 
Kuki’s philosophical methodology is similar to Heidegger’s in its ex­
amination of concrete experience. But the leading question for Kuki is 
the character of the Japanese people whereas for Heidegger it is the 
disclosure of Being itself. More significantly, Kuki’s approach is based 
on duality while Heidegger seeks to uncover what he calls the Same or 
belonging-together, that is, the splendor of the simple onefold (Einfalt) 
which unites the fourfold (Geviert) of earth, sky, mortals, and gods.
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Kuki’s notion is not a naive duality in that he highlights the creative ten­
sion and mutuality made possible by virtue of polarity, but this is not 
comparable to Heidegger’s view of the dynamic, organic, and natu­
ralist interplay of Being and beings, presencing and things present al­
lowing the simultaneity of individuality and universality: “None of 
the four insists on its own separate particularity. Rather, each is ex­
propriated, within their mutual appropriation, into its own being. This 
expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play of the fourfold. Out of 
the fourfold, the simple onefold of the four is ventured.”40 In the 
dialogue with Tezuka, Heidegger expresses misgivings about the way 
Kuki has presupposed Western metaphysical categories that falsely 
bifurcate reality. But when Tezuka explains kotoba with the lyrical im­
age of a poet who “sings of the intermingling scent of cherry blossom 
and plum blossom on the same branch,” Heidegger responds, “That’s 
how I think of... unconcealment.. .”41
40 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought: 179.
41 Heidegger, On the Way to Language: 53.
42 Ibid: 48.
Yugen and the Constellation of Thing-Word-Mind
Because of the participants’ sensitivity to the danger of dialogue, the 
Tezuka-Heidegger conversation is marked more by hesitation, delibera­
tion and disclaimer than by certainty or firm conclusions. In fact, the 
key turning point is delayed for over twenty pages when the Inquirer 
asks about the Japanese word for language and Tezuka after “long 
reflection” at first refuses to utter it. When he feels confident in the 
assurances that it will not be misrepresented, Tezuka says that the word 
hints toward the source or wellspring of language and is very near “to 
us Japanese.” However, Tezuka’s remark that kotoba is “a word to 
which so far no thought has been given .. .”42 is somewhat misleading. 
There may be no contemporary phenomenological analysis of the term 
along the lines of Kuki’s interpretation of iki. But there is a con­
siderable body of material from medieval literary criticism, which 
shows the link between language and mind in the creative process, as 




The original meaning of language in Japanese culture is probably 
connected to agrarian animistic/shamanistic practices involving 
kotodama, or the belief in the soul or spirit (tama) of words (koto). 
According to R. A. Miller, the Old Japanese koto (words, speech, 
language) is related to the verb katar (tell, relate) in the same way the 
English “tale” is related to “tell.” This seems comparable to the con­
nection Heidegger draws between Saying and the traditional term saga 
as a mythopoeic mode of discourse prior to the distinction between 
mythos and logos. Like many ancient religions, from Biblical to tribal 
culture, the Japanese affirmed the power of the word or name to pro­
vide mastery over things. Miller shows that in the practice of early 
Japanese homeopathic magic there was a strong connection between 
the term koto meaning words and another homophonous term koto 
meaning affair, matter, or thing. According to Miller, “the idea that 
the ‘thing’ referred to by a given word is coeval as well as coextensive 
with the ‘word’ that refers to it is at the heart of the whole matter.”43 
Kotodama is also connected to kotoage (literally “lifting up words”), a 
ritualistic, liturgical practice based on the metaphoric transference of 
the identification of word and thing from the terrestrial to the super­
natural plane. Thus, it was believed that naming or calling upon a thing 
desired would cause the “thing” so “named” to materialize.
43 R. A. Miller, “The ‘Spirit’ of the Japanese Language,” in Journal of Japanese 
Studies, 3/2: 264. See also the article on Japanese Religion in Encyclopedia of 
Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), volume 7: 555-56.
44 Ki no Tsurayuki, in Nihon koten bungaku zenshQ (Tokyo: Kogakukan, 1971), 
volume 7.
While animistic sources establish the affinity of word and thing, one 
of the earliest references to kotoba in the sense in which it is used by 
Tezuka as the “petals” (ba) of “words” (koto) demonstrates the 
inseparability of language and the mind as the perceptive organ for 
things. In his famous preface to the Kokinsha imperial poetry collec­
tion, Tsurayuki depicts mind (kokoro) as an undeniable impulse 
toward poetic creativity that inevitably flourishes like a natural force in 
response to the stimuli of the seasons and elements:44
The poetry of Japan takes hold in the mind of man and 
springs forth in the innumerable petals of words. Because of 
man’s intense involvement in the world, [it is poetry] that ex­
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presses the inner attitude of his mind upon viewing [the sights 
of the world] and hearing [its sounds].
According to Tsurayuki, the mind represents the potential of con­
sciousness to perceive phenomena and creatively describe them. When 
activated by sense impressions generated by external stimuli like the 
sights and sounds of nature, the kokoro responds by expressing kotoba 
that directly record its feelings about the event. Thus, kotoba is part of 
a constellation of thing-word-mind, whereby the mind is continually 
perceiving and responding to things (koto) through poetic speech. 
Nishitani Keiji comments on this connection: “In Japanese, the ‘mean­
ing’ of a given koto (a term signifying either ‘matter’ or ‘affair,’ as well 
as ‘word’) can also be called its ‘mind,’ or kokoro.. .. the mind of the 
matter at hand (or the very reality become manifest in the koto) reflects 
into the mind of man, and the mind of man reflects itself onto the mind 
of the koto. This living transmission of minds being projected onto one 
another as they are, and the obtaining of mind that this effects, is the 
elemental mode of the understanding of meaning.’’45
45 Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, tr. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California, 1982): 178.
* Sec Joseph Spae, Japanese Religiosity (Tokyo: Oriens Institute for Religious 
Research, 1971): 184; and Toshihiko and Toyo Izutsu, The Theory of Beauty in the 
Classical Aesthetics of Japan (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981): 27. Also Nose 
Asaji, YQgenron (Tokyo: Kawade shobO, 1944).
In late Heian/early Kamakura poetry of the ShinkokinshQ era in­
fluenced by Buddhist meditation, yQgen designates the style of composi­
tion in which there is a dynamic integration of the key factors compris­
ing this constellation revolving around a contemplative view of nature. 
YQgen, in a manner similar to Heidegger’s notion of bringing into un­
concealment by preserving concealment, represents a paradoxical 
disclosure that illuminates precisely by seeming to conceal. Both parts 
of the compound term suggest indistinctness and inscrutability derived 
from early Chinese religion: yu (C. yu), which appears in I Ching and 
Taoist esoteric writings, is that which is hazy or unclear to the senses, a 
kind of veil which is a hint of loftier realms; and gen (C. hsiian), which 
appears in the opening chapter of the Tao te ching, is the calm repose 
of the unfathomable depths of ultimate darkness.46 The compound, of 
uncertain origin, indicates that the vague and obscure reveal the 
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positive spiritual quality underlying the negative imagery and the pro­
fundity pervading the mundane. But this must not be mistaken for a 
formal reconciliation of opposites that takes place in a logical process. 
Rather, the implication of yQgen is to heighten the paradox in that the 
greater the supposed inability to penetrate a phenomenon, the more 
dramatic and fundamental the breakthrough that occurs on an in­
tuitive level of awareness. This is exemplified in the following Teika 
verse, one of three famous waka ending with the image of autumn 
sunset:47
47 Teika in ShinkokinshQ I, 38 in Nihon koten bungaku zenshQ, volume 26. For the 
other poems by Saigyd and Jakuren see Donald Keene, ed. Anthology of Japanese 
Literature (Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Tuttle, 1955): 195.
48 Richard B. Pilgrim, “The artistic way and the religio-aesthetic tradition in
Miwataseba
Mana mo momiji mo 
Nakarikeri




Cherry blossoms and crimson leaves, 
At the straw-thatched huts by the bay 
Clustered in the descending autumn dusk.
The most striking feature of yugen is the deceptively simple descrip­
tion of nature that borders on realism. Yttgen poems contain landscape 
imagery frequently of a monochromatic type, such as bayside huts at 
autumn dusk, a bird flying into the sunset, a cloudy mist, or a forest of 
dark pines. Yet these scenes are uniquely and profoundly meaningful 
because they are observed from a distinct contemplative vantage 
point—as in the opening line above containing the verb miwatasu (lit. 
“to survey” or “to look out beyond”), or as often symbolized by a 
mountain retreat or hermitage. The settings are not merely external ob­
jects but represent an holistic perceptional field encompassing self and 
other. The images are selected to reflect mind and nature dwelling on 
the boundary line between day and night, fall and winter, and earth 
and sky. In highlighting the creative tension and experiential moment 
of transition between reality and dream, fact and imagination, they 
draw the reader into the mysterious depth simultaneously revealed and 
concealed by the purely descriptive phrase. Thus, “yfigen functions as 
a scrim, haze, or dream through which the numinal is vaguely sensed ... 
pointing] beyond itself to a sense of Reality veiled by, and not confin­
ed to, the phenomenal world.”48 It indicates that the natural setting 
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depicted is not a place outside the apprehending subject but the 
phenomenal locus of genuine subjectivity attained through Buddhist 
contemplation. As the poet Tamekane says of seasonal poetry, “In 
order to express the true nature of the natural scene, one must focus 
one’s attention and concentrate deeply upon it. . . . Therefore, if you 
try to harmonize your feelings with the sight of cherry blossoms . .. 
your work will become one with the very spirit of heaven and earth.”49
Furthermore, the simplicity of the language used in yQgen poetry on 
the semantic level of concrete, linear articulation rests on a syntactic 
field of trans-temporal wordplay and associations “achieving a 
polyphonic plenitude of meanings, images and ideas.”50 The ideal of 
yojO implies that the brevity and simplicity of yQgen descriptions of 
nature is based on having too much to say or reveal about the mind, so 
that, as Chomei writes, “many meanings are compressed into a single 
word, [and] the depths of feeling are exhausted yet not expressed . ..” 
According to Teika, the “poetic masterpiece must have ... a profundi­
ty and sublimity of mind and creativity of expression allowing an 
eminently graceful poetic configuration to emerge with an aesthetic 
plenitude that overflows [or is outside] of words (kotoba no hoka made 
amareru).”51 The kokoro consists of two aspects: cogitations (omoi) 
which lead to semantic articulation; and more importantly in terms of 
poetic creativity emotions (the jo of yo-jo, also pronounced nasake or 
kokoro) which operate on a trans-linguistic or syntactic level of holistic 
experience.52 The formula for the function of yojb is, the less that is ac-
Japan,” in Philosophy East and West, 27/3: 294.
49 Cited in Earl Miner, An Introduction to Japanese Court Poetry (Stanford: Stan­
ford University Press, 1968): 127. For the influence of shikan (cessation-cont­
emplation) on Shunzei in particular see Konishi Jin’ichi, “Shunzei no yilgen-fu to 
shikan,” Bungaku 20/2: 108-16. For the ideological connection between Buddhist 
meditation and poetic inspiration see also the discussion by William R. LaFleur in the 
chapter, “Symbol and Yugen,” in The Karma of Words: Buddhism and the Literary 
Arts in Medieval Japan (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1983): 80-106.
50 Izutsus: 4.
51 Teika, “MaigetsushO: 349.
52 There is an interesting parallel to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s constitution in 
terms of state-of-mind or mood (Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen) which 
“characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. By way of having a 
mood Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities, in terms of which it is.” In Being and Time, tr. John 
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tually verbalized in terms of omoi the more the composition discloses 
concerning Jo by not saying it. This also seems to be the principle 
underlying typically terse Zen sayings conveying a contemplative 
stance, including* * willows are green, flowers are red,” “the sun rises in 
the east, the moon sets in the west,” “the snow falling in a silver 
bowl,” and “learn of the pine tree from the pine tree,”* 513 which are 
deceptively simple linguistic vehicles for spontaneously revealing the 
realization of suchness. The issue for both the poets and Zen is to find 
an expression which suggests the depths of the experience while enun­
ciating the fewest words which might obfuscate the true vision. The ex­
pression must be a direct manifestation of the mind’s profundity, 
bypassing false objectification that reflects an inauthentic personal 
response to nature, thereby creating a language field of multiple 
nuances that manifests the contemplative field of authenticated subjec­
tivity.
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962): 
188.
51 The first example appears in the Zenrin kushQ collection, the second in DOgen’s
Chinese poetry, the third in Zeami’s writings on Noh (and elsewhere), and the third in
a BashO haiku.
54 Heidegger, On the Way to Language-. 99.
Comparison of Yugen and Nearness
The yagen/yojO style of composition appears very close to Heideg­
ger’s view of Saying as an expression of the splendor of the simple 
without why. Heidegger seeks a polysemous language reflecting poetic, 
acquiescent thinking that allows the presence of Being to unfold with­
out interference. One striking similarity with the Japanese approach 
involves the way that Heidegger, interpreting Holderlin’s poetry, de­
picts authentic language as the “flower of the mouth ... [in which] the 
earth blossoms toward the bloom of the sky.”54 If words are the flower, 
then the seed or root is what Heidegger calls meditative thinking or 
releasement (Gelassenheit) to the open realm or the fourfold. In 
this context, Heidegger suggests that the intimate connection between 
thing-word-thought is reflected in the original meaning of logos which 
in early Greek philosophy implied both Saying as showing and Being 
as the coming to presence of things present. True logos therefore cul­
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minates in poetic Saying: “All essential Saying hearkens back to this 
veiled mutual belonging of Saying and Being, word and thing. Both 
poetry and thinking are distinctive Saying in that they remain deliv­
ered over to the mystery of the word as that which is most worthy of 
their thinking .. .”55
” Ibid: 155-156.
* Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought: 173.
57 Ibid: 14.
For Heidegger the center of the constellation or the force exerting a 
gravitational pull that sustains the rotation of the various factors is 
“nearness.” This notion does not refer to a spatial as opposed to a tem­
poral dimension. Nor is it a matter of measuring parameters or the 
proximity of objectified entities for nearness preserves farness. Near­
ness, the “true fourth-dimension,” represents a direct, “face-to-face” 
encounter with things without why which creates an atmosphere of 
neighborliness between Being and words, and thinking and poetry re­
gardless of physical distance. Somewhat akin to yUgen, nearness strad­
dles the line and highlights the creative tension between resemblance 
and remoteness, affinity and separation. It seems best conveyed by the 
image of a simple, concrete artifact, like a jug, a bridge, or Van 
Gogh’s painting of worn peasant shoes, which harbor mysterious, un­
fathomable depths of meaning supporting and amplifying the thing­
ness of the thing. The dynamic interplay of the fourfold functions by 
virtue of nearness as a playful dance which enables each aspect to 
come into its individual fulfillment. But amidst the intricacy and com­
plexity simple presencing prevails: “In the gift of the outpouring 
dwells the simple singlefoldness of the four.”56
Like the contemplative Japanese thinkers and poets, Heidegger in ad­
dition to interpreting the “origin (Ursprung) of the work of art” tries 
to speak from out of rather than about language by occasionally 
creating his own verse. Of these, the sample that comes closest to the 












The first and fourth lines especially convey the dark and solitary realm 
indicative of ytlgen as experienced from the contemplative standpoint 
suggested by the final phrase, “blessing muses.” The last line of the 
poem discloses the profound subjectivity at once revealed and conceal­
ed by the preceding simple, realistic description of nature.
But to what extent is genuine subjectivity attained in Heidegger’s 
thought, and by what means? Here is the issue that seems to create a 
stumbling block for Heidegger in his attempted dialogue with the Easta- 
sian house of Being. The main discrepancy is that while Heidegger em­
phasizes primordial Saying as the arrival of an event obediently receiv­
ed by the human subject, the Japanese contemplatives consistently 
stress the priority of mind as the creative force in the expression of 
authentic language. That is, the main writers/critics who theorize on 
the creative process of ydgen, especially Teika and Zeami, maintain 
that the cultivation of kokoro through spiritual discipline is the neces­
sary basis of kotoba, and therefore that kotoba is the means to attaining 
authentic kokoro rather than vice-versa. Teika’s “MaigetsushO” and 
other writings, for example, are largely derived from Tendai medita­
tive practice of cessation-contemplation (shikari) coupled with an em­
phasis on seated posture resembling zazen. There, he asserts that the 
basis of composing poems that express yQgen must be the direct and 
unimpeded effusion from the true or original mind (moto no kokoro) 
of serene subjectivity (an-sho). He recommends that poetry should be 
composed only when “one is fully immersed in the unique realm of the 
serene composure and concentration of the mind.”58 He also warns 
against emotional miasmas or delusions, including trying to force either 
understanding or language in an arbitrary or deliberate way, that in- 
authentically conceal rather than spontaneously express the kokoro of 
poetic composition.
Thus, Teika articulates a view of the mind as the subjective basis of 
self-illuminative awareness, and he reinterprets Tsurayuki’s Kokinsha
” Teika, “MaigetsushO: 347. 
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commentary on the mind as the root or seed of poetry and words as the 
blossoms from the standpoint of Buddhist contemplation. For Tsura­
yuki, the mind is a potentiality for creativity that is essentially recep­
tive in its function. When activated by sense impressions generated 
by external stimuli like natural sights and sounds presented to the eyes 
and ears, the mind responds by expressing words that record its feelings 
about the event. Teika revises Tsurayuki’s comments by eliminating 
any gap between potentiality and actuality, internal and external, and 
subjectivity and objectivity by virtue of the authentication and purifi­
cation of the mind through meditative awareness. Therefore, language 
is not a mere expression or extension of a mind seen as distinct from 
and reacting to external phenomena. Rather, kotoba spontaneously 
emerges as an unblocked overflow (yojb) from the self-surpassing 
kokoro fully and dynamically engaged in creatively experiencing reality. 
“In the aesthetic configuration ... of the poem created in this way,” 
Teika writes, “the kokoro as well as the kotoba abide tranquilly. But 
you must not attempt to compose deliberately such a poem. When you 
attain the proper state of cultivation, it will issue forth effortlessly.”59
59 Ibid: 349-50.
60 Nishio Minoru, Ddgen to Zeami (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1965): 115f.
Nishio Minoru argues that Zeami’s approach to yagen is influenced 
by DOgen’s interpretation of genjOkOan as the spontaneous manifesta­
tion of the inseparability of enlightenment mind and reality.60 In his 
view of yagen aesthetics as the subjective attainment of purity and tran­
quility by both actor and audience engaged in the play’s performance, 
Zeami seems to take the emphasis on kokoro a step further than Teika. 
Nishio shows that Zeami’s saying, “The flower is the mind, the seed is 
the performance” (hana wa kokoro, tone wa waza narubeshi) repre­
sents the complete reversal of Tsurayuki’s understanding. Now the 
realization of spiritual truth has priority as the goal of artistic training 
over the verbal demonstration of art as the means to achieving it. That 
is, Tsurayuki sees kokoro as the seed and kotoba as the blossom, but 
for Teika and especially Zeami whose views are based largely on Bud­
dhist meditation the kokoro is the flower (hana).
The Japanese contemplative approach to mind stands in contrast to 
Heidegger who tends to view Saying as pan of the appropriating event 
(Ereignis) or the historical unfolding of Being coming towards the 
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human subject. Humans respond or cor-respond to Saying by listening 
to its silent call and then speaking. “Saying grants the hearing, and 
thus the speaking, of language solely to those who belong within it.”61 
Thus, Saying not only has priority over thinking, but it represents a 
primordial presence and absence that is ontologically prior to and 
makes possible the authenticity or inauthenticity of human language. 
In Heidegger’s metaphor of gift-giving discussed above, Being is the 
giver, humans the receiver, and Saying the gift—the gift of words to 
address that which bestows it. Based on an image used in Derrida’s 
philosophy, John D. Caputo suggests that a postal principle underlies 
Heidegger’s notion of hermeneutics as the method of interpreting the 
message sent by Being. “(I)n Heidegger,” he argues, “an eschato­
logical postal principle is at work: an original letter is sent out, filled 
with words of primordial power, but it is immediately lost. Only traces 
of it remain, tom-up fragments, until finally, just when we think it has 
fallen altogether into oblivion, we awaken to the postal principle, to 
the eschatological code which tells us about the way that metaphysics 
writes in reverse, circling back upon itself.”62 Thus words are authentic 
in that they emulate the power of the original letter rather than because 
they reflect purified subjectivity. However, it is possible to see Heideg­
ger’s view as complementary instead of contradictory of Japanese 
aesthetics by borrowing terminology used by Kyoto-school thinkers in­
cluding Takeuchi Yoshinori in his JodO-shin oriented presentation of 
fundamental Buddhism. According to Takeuchi, Buddhist enlighten­
ment involves not only a trans-cendence elevating the mind to ex­
perience liberation but a trans-descendence or advency (Zu-kunft) of 
the yonder shore to the hither shore.63 Seen in this light, Japanese con­
templation stresses transcendence or self-elevation of kokoro and 
Heidegger stresses transdescendence or the coming-toward humans of 
Saying. But there is also a transdescendent dimension in Zen practice in 
the sense that, as Abe Masao explains, “There is nothing outside the
61 Heidegger, On the Way to Language: 124.
62 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the 
Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987): 
169.
61 Takeuchi Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism: In Search of the Timeless Spirit of 
Primitive Buddhism, tr. James W. Heisig (New York: Crossroad, 1983). This ter­
minology is also used in Nishitani: 174-75 especially.
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Buddha-nature. Therefore, it is not that I awaken to the Buddha* 
nature, but that the Buddha-nature awakens to the Buddha-nature. And 
that it is manifested in me is the true meaning of my awakening to 
the Buddha-nature.”64
64 Abe Masao, A Study of Dbgen: His Philosophy and Religion, ed. Steven Heine 
(Albany: Suny Press, forthcoming).
6: Izutsu: 22; for example, a waka bearing the subjectivist title, “At no time are 
delusory thoughts to arise in mind,” paradoxically refers not to the mind but only to 
nature, “About the mountain crest/ A brush of cloud floating/ Wild geese fly in files 
passing/ As the moon is hiding behind/ a pine-tree on the ridge.” See also Nishida 
Masayoshi, Nihon bungaku no shizenkan (Tokyo: KOdansha, 1972).
Even so, a subtle but important difference remains because Heideg­
ger’s “postal principle” implies that reflection, correction, and purifi­
cation of thinking that responds to Saying is determined by Being alone 
and not by any human effort. To some extent, both Heidegger and 
Japanese contemplatives are wary of human willfulness or inauthen­
tic intentionality which cannot help but distort the very understand­
ing it tries to grasp. However, Heidegger may be satisfied with the 
vertical model of interpretation implied by the term transdescendence 
as an arrival of the message from beyond whereas yUgen poetry in­
volves a full and direct horizontal participation of subjectivity in the 
realm of nature. For the Japanese contemplative, nature is not an 
“other” more or less elevated than the human subject in any literal 
sense but the externalized form of interior subjective illumination, 
so that “he recognizes Nature as the external locus where he can get 
into the most immediate and intimate contact with his own inner 
Self (the non-articulated), lyQgen] is no other than a description of 
Nature as his contemplative ‘field*. . .”65
Therefore, the composition of the yQgen style is a “path” (do, 
michi) of spiritual discipline (shugyO) to realize the original essence 
(hon'i) of true mind (ushin). At the culminative point yUgen offers 
nothing more or less than pure, simple description of reality without 
why. Attaining this realization involves at least two main stages of in­
ner development that can be illustrated by interpreting the Teika verse 
on the autumn sunset quoted above. The first three lines imply a con­
templative flight beyond delimiting horizons that are historical and 
perceptual in character. The author seeks a path transcending both the 
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poetic tradition, which has relied so heavily on the conventional sea­
sonal images of blossoms and leaves to symbolize transiency, and the 
ordinary arena of perception, in which the colorful yet fading natural 
forms seem so irresistibly attractive. The poem juxtaposes spring flow­
ers and autumn leaves which cannot possibly exist at the same time to 
show that the contemplative field is truly holistic in embracing and 
surpassing the opposites of seasonal rotation.
The final lines of the poem reflect an experiential structure consisting 
of a negation of the subject through an aflirmation of the object of 
perception. The description of nature here and in other examples of 
yGgen appears as if striving for a vivid and realistic presentation of in­
triguing aspects of nature perceived by a distant subject. Yet the intend­
ed effect is nearly opposite to realism in that nature depicted in its 
primordial state completely mirrors the realization of the authentic sub­
jectivity of kokoro. The aim of yQgen is to overcome the gap between 
poet or subject and poetic object or topic in order to encounter and cap­
ture the essentially unified experience of reality without why. As 
Konishi Jin’ichi suggests, “The contemplative expressive approach in­
volves the bracketing of a poet’s individual impressions and drawing 
near to the very essence of the subject. Once the essence has been 
regained, the poet will recommence grasping forms manifested on a 
more superficial level of awareness . .. [leaving the reader with] a sense 
of profound mystery and difficulty.”66 Thus, the less the kotoba stemm­
ing from an overflow of kokoro (or yojb) says about the the mind, the 
more profound the awakening for this indicates that the mind is 
bracketed because it is so fully and redemptively absorbed in the con­
templative field of nature.
In conclusion, a dialogue between Heidegger and Buddhist-oriented 
aesthetics highlights the tension inherent in Heidegger’s philosophical 
project. As indicated above, Bruzina argues that Heidegger is tom 
between metaphysical and post-metaphysical language, or between 
philosophy and poetry. However, the encounter with Japanese con- 
templatives locates this crossroads not in terms of the type of language 
used by Heidegger or the separation of different language-houses, but 
in terms of the relation between language and mind as the necessary
** Konishi, “Michi and Medieval Writing,” in Principles of Classical Japanese 
Literature, ed. Earl Miner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985): 204. 
85
HEINE
foundation for discourse. That is not to suggest that Japanese poetry 
provides the solution to Heidegger’s search for primordial Saying. 
Kuki’s emphasis on the cultural determination of experiential truths 
shows that certain words and phrases probably cannot be transported 
between houses of being; perhaps “autumn dusk descending” would 
not have the resonance or ambience Heidegger seeks. On the other 
hand, the notion of spiritual cultivation underlying language that can 
speak directly of reality without why is universalizable, and it can also 
be found in the Western contemplative tradition. For example, the 
anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing counsels practitioners 
not to think of how or what existence is but simply that it is.67 Ueda 
argues that while Heidegger attempts to speak of reality without why 
he still looks for the principle (Satz) of the ground or reason (Grund) 
of things. Thus passing from the “what” to the “that” is the impasse 
for Heidegger, the “gateless gate” (mumonkan) Bruzina tries to clarify 
that cannot be penetrated without authentication of kokoro.
67 In the second volume of William Johnston, ed. The Cloud of Unknowing and The 
Book of Privy Counseling (Garden City, NY: Image, 1973): 152. However, these 
works clearly have a theistic foundation as when the author says, “Yet a radical distinc­
tion remains: [God] alone is his own cause and his own being (152).
“ Ddgen, first volume of Eihei Koroku, in DOgen zenji zenshQ. ed. Okubo DdshQ 
(Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1970), volume II. This verse is also discussed in Nishida: 197; 
and in Nishitani: 188f (the translation here is somewhat different).
But what is that! How is it disclosed without obstructing it? One 
path to revealing that (or thus as it is, tathata, nyo-nyo) indirectly by 
concealing it is reflected in Bodhidharma’s response to the question of 
his identity. According to the first case of Hekiganroku, Bodhidhar­
ma’s answer is simply, “I don’t know,” which is not a matter of ig­
norance in the ordinary sense but a Cusanus-like docta ignorantia in 
which why and not-why, reason and no-reason have been abandoned 
altogether. Another approach expresses the myterious, solitary, mono­
chromatic atmosphere of yQgen nature-description as conveyed by the 
apparent realism in Ddgen’s Chinese verse:68
Every morning, the sun rises in the east, 
Every night, the moon sets in the west; 
Clouds gathering over the foggy peaks, 
Rain passes through the surrounding hills and plains.
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